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I study monetary and fiscal policy in liquidity trap scenarios, where the zero bound on the nominal
interest rate is binding. I work with a continuous-time version of the standard New Keynesian model.
Without commitment, the economy suffers from deflation and depressed output. I show that, surprisingly,
both are exacerbated with greater price flexibility. I examine monetary and fiscal policies that maximize
utility for the agent in the model and refer to these as optimal throughout the paper. I find that the optimal
interest rate is set to zero past the liquidity trap and jumps discretely up upon exit. Inflation may be
positive throughout, so the absence of deflation is not evidence against a liquidity trap. Output, on
the other hand, always starts below its efficient level and rises above it. I then study fiscal policy and
show that, regardless of parameters that govern the value of "fiscal multipliers" during normal or liquidity
trap times, at the start of a liquidity trap optimal spending is above its natural level. However, it declines
over time and goes below its natural level. I propose a decomposition of spending according to "opportunistic"
and "stimulus" motives. The former is defined as the level of government purchases that is optimal
from a static, cost-benefit standpoint, taking into account that, due to slack resources, shadow costs
may be lower during a slump; the latter measures deviations from the former. I show that stimulus
spending may be zero throughout, or switch signs, depending on parameters. Finally, I consider the
hybrid where monetary policy is discretionary, but fiscal policy has commitment. In this case, stimulus








The 2007-8 crisis in the U.S. lead to a steep recession, followed by aggressive policy re-
sponses. Monetary policy went full tilt, cutting interest rates rapidly to zero, where they
have remained since the end of 2008. With conventional monetary policy seemingly ex-
hausted, ﬁscal stimulus worth $787 billion was enacted by early 2009 as part of the Amer-
ican Recovery and Reinvestment Act. Unconventional monetary policies were also pur-
sued, starting with “quantitative easing”, purchases of long-term bonds and other assets.
In August 2011, the Federal Reserve’s FOMC statement signaled the intent to keep inter-
estratesatzerountilatleastmid2013. Similarpolicieshavebeenfollowed, atleastduring
the peak of the crisis, by many advanced economies. Fortunately, the kind of crises that
result in such extreme policy measures have been relatively few and far between. Perhaps
as a consequence, the debate over whether such policies are appropriate remains largely
unsettled. The purpose of this paper is to make progress on these issues.
To this end, I reexamine monetary and ﬁscal policy in a liquidity trap, where the zero
bound on nominal interest rate binds. I work with a standard New Keynesian model that
builds on Eggertsson and Woodford (2003).1 In these models a liquidity trap is deﬁned as
a situation where negative real interest rates are needed to obtain the ﬁrst-best allocation.
I adopt a deterministic continuous time formulation that turns out to have several advan-
tages. It is well suited to focus on the dynamic questions of policy, such as the optimal exit
strategy, whetherspendingshouldbefront-orback-loaded, etc. Italsoallowsforasimple
graphical analysis and delivers several new results. The alternative most employed in the
literature is a discrete-time Poisson model, where the economy starts in a trap and exits
from it with a constant exogenous probability each period. This speciﬁcation is especially
convenient to study the effects of suboptimal and simple Markov policies—because the
1Eggertsson (2001, 2006) study government spending during a liquidity trap a New Keynesian model,
with the main focus is on the case without commitment and implicit commitment to inﬂate afforded by
rising debt. Christiano et al. (2011), Woodford (2011) and Eggertsson (2011) consider the effects of spending
on output, computing “ﬁscal multipliers”, but do not focus on optimal policy.
2equilibrium calculations then reduce to ﬁnding a few numbers—but does not afford any
comparable advantages for the optimal policy problem.
I examine policies that maximize welfare for the agent in the model and refer to them
throughout as optimal. I consider the policy problem under commitment, under discre-
tion and for some intermediate cases. I am interested in monetary policy, ﬁscal policy, as
well as their interplay. What does optimal monetary policy look like? How does the com-
mitment solution compare to the discretionary one? How does it depend on the degree of
price stickiness? How can ﬁscal policy complement optimal monetary policy? Can ﬁscal
policy mitigate the problem created by discretionary monetary policy? To what extent is
spending governed by a concern to inﬂuence the private economy as captured by "ﬁscal
multipliers", or by simple cost-beneﬁt public ﬁnance considerations?
I ﬁrst study monetary policy in the absence of ﬁscal policy. When monetary policy
lacks commitment, deﬂation and depression ensue. Both are commonly associated with
liquidity traps. Less familiar is that both outcomes are exacerbated by price ﬂexibility.
Thus, one does not need to argue for a large degree of price stickiness to worry about the
problems created by a liquidity trap. In fact, quite the contrary. I show that the depression
becomes unbounded as we converge to fully ﬂexible prices. The intuition for this result
is that the main problem in a liquidity trap is an elevated real interest rate. This leads
to depressed output, which creates deﬂationary pressures. Price ﬂexibility accelerates
deﬂation, raising the real interest rate further and only making matters worse.
As ﬁrst argued by Krugman (1998), optimal monetary policy can improve on this dire
outcome by committing to future policy in a way that affects current expectations favor-
ably. In particular, I show that, it is optimal to promote future inﬂation and stimulate a
boom in output. I establish that optimal inﬂation may be positive throughout the episode,
so that deﬂation is completely avoided. Thus, the absence of deﬂation, far from being at
odds with a liquidity trap, actually may be evidence of an optimal response to such a situ-
ation. I show that output starts below its efﬁcient level, but rises above it towards the end
3of the trap. Indeed, the boom in output is larger than that stimulated by the inﬂationary
promise.
There are a number of ways monetary policy can promote inﬂation and stimulate
output. Monetary easing does not necessarily imply a low equilibrium interest rate path.
Indeed, as in most monetary models, the nominal interest rate path does not uniquely
determine an equilibrium. Indeed, an interest rate of zero during the trap that becomes
positive immediately after the trap is consistent with positive inﬂation and output after
the trap.2 I show, however, that the optimal policy with commitment involves keeping
the interest rate down at zero longer. The continuous time formulation helps here because
it avoids time aggregation issues that may otherwise obscure the result.
Some of my results echo ﬁndings from prior work based on simulations for a Poisson
speciﬁcation of the natural rate of interest. Christiano et al. (2011) reports that, when the
central bank follows a Taylor rule, price stickiness increases the decline in output during
a liquidity trap. Eggertsson and Woodford (2003), Jung et al. (2005) and Adam and Billi
(2006) ﬁnd that the optimal interest rate path may keep it at zero after the natural rate
of interest becomes positive. To the best of my knowledge this paper provides the ﬁrst
formal results explaining these ﬁndings for inﬂation, output and interest rates.
An implication of my result is that the interest rate should jump discretely upon exit-
ing the zero bound—a property that can only be appreciated in continuous time. Thus,
even when fundamentals vary continuously, optimal policy calls for a discontinuous in-
terest rate path.
Turning to ﬁscal policy, I show that, there is a role for government spending dur-
ing a liquidity trap. Spending should be front-loaded. At the start of the liquidity trap,
government spending should be higher than its natural level. However, during the trap
2For example, a zero interest during the trap and an interest equal to the natural rate outside the trap.
This is the same path for the interest rate that results with discretionary monetary policy. However, in that
case, the outcome for inﬂation and output is pinned down by the requirement that they reach zero upon
exiting the trap. With commitment, the same path for interest rates is consistent with higher inﬂation and
output upon exit.
4spending should fall and reach a level below its natural level. Intuitively, optimal govern-
ment spending is countercyclical, it leans against the wind. Private consumption starts
out below its efﬁcient level, but reaches levels above its efﬁcient level near the end of the
liquidity trap. The pattern for government spending is just the opposite.
The optimal pattern for total government spending masks two potential motives. Per-
haps the most obvious, especially within the context of a New Keynesian model, is the
macroeconomic, countercyclical one. Government spending affects private consumption
and inﬂation through dynamic general equilibrium effects. In a liquidity trap this may be
particularly useful, to mitigate the depression and deﬂation associated with these events.
However, a second, often ignored, motive is based on the idea that government spend-
ing should react to the cycle even based on static, cost-beneﬁt calculations. In a slump,
the wage, or shadow wage, of labor is low. This makes it is an opportune time to produce
government goods. During the debates for the 2009 ARRA stimulus bill, variants of this
argument were put forth.
Based on these notions, I propose a decomposition of spending into "stimulus" and
"opportunistic" components. The latter is deﬁned as the optimal static level of govern-
ment spending, taking private consumption as given. The former is just the difference
between actual spending and opportunistic spending.
I show that the optimum calls for zero stimulus at the beginning of a liquidity trap.
Thus, my previous result, showing that spending starts out positive, can be attributed
entirely to the opportunistic component of spending. More surprisingly, I then show
that for some parameter values stimulus spending is everywhere exactly zero, so that,
in these cases, opportunistic spending accounts for all of government spending policy
during a liquidity trap. Of course, opportunistic spending does, incidentally, inﬂuence
consumption and inﬂation. But the point is that these considerations need not ﬁgure into
the calculation. In this sense, public ﬁnance trumps macroeconomic policy.
Another implication is that, in such cases, commitment to a path for government
5spending is superﬂuous. A naive, ﬁscal authority that acts with full discretion and per-
forms the static cost-beneﬁt calculation chooses the optimal path for spending.
These results assume that monetary policy is optimal. Things can be quite different
when monetary policy is suboptimal due to lack of commitment. To address this I study
a mixed case, where monetary policy is discretionary but ﬁscal policy has the power to
commit to a government spending path. Positive stimulus spending emerges as a way to
ﬁght deﬂation. Indeed, the optimal intervention is to provide positive stimulus spending
that rises over time during the liquidity trap. Back-loading stimulus spending provides a
bigger bang for the buck, both in terms of inﬂation and output. Since price setting is for-
ward looking, spending near the end promotes inﬂation both near the end and earlier. In
addition, any improvement in the real rate of return near the end of the liquidity trap im-
proves the output outcome level for earlier dates. Both reasons point towards increasing
stimulus spending.
If the ﬁscal authority can commit past the trap, then it is optimal to promise lower
spending immediately after the trap, and converge towards the natural rate of spending
after that. Spending features a discrete downward jump upon exiting the trap. Intuitively,
after the trap, once the ﬂexible price equilibrium is attainable, lower government spend-
ing leads to a consumption boom. This is beneﬁcial, for the same reasons that monetary
policy with commitment promotes a boom, because it raises the consumption level dur-
ing the trap. Thus, the commitment to lower spending after the trap attempts to mimic
the expansionary effects that the missing monetary commitments would have provided.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the model. Section
3 studies the equilibrium without ﬁscal policy when monetary policy is conducted with
discretion. Section 4 studies optimal monetary policy with commitment. Section 5 adds
ﬁscal policy and studies the optimal path for government spending alongside optimal
monetary policy. Section 6 considers mixed cases where monetary policy is discretionary,
but ﬁscal policy enjoys commitment.
62 A Liquidity Trap Scenario
The model is a continuous-time version of the standard New Keynesian model. The envi-
ronment features a representative agent, monopolistic competition and Calvo-style sticky
prices; it abstracts from capital investment. I spare the reader another rendering of the de-
tails of this standard setting (see e.g. Woodford, 2003, or Galí, 2008) and skip directly to
the well-known log-linear approximation of the equilibrium conditions which I use in the
remainder of the paper.
Euler Equation and Phillips Curve. The equilibrium conditions, log linearized around
zero inﬂation, are
˙ x(t) = s 1(i(t)   r(t)   p(t)) (1a)
˙ p(t) = rp(t)   kx(t) (1b)
i(t)  0 (1c)
where r,s and k are positive constants and the path fr(t)g is exogenous and given. We
also require a solution (p(t),x(t)) to remain bounded. The variable x(t) represents the
output gap: the log difference between actual output and the hypothetical output that
would prevail at the efﬁcient, ﬂexible price, outcome. Inﬂation is denoted by p(t) and
the nominal interest rate by i(t). Finally, r(t) stands for the “natural rate of interest”,
i.e. the real interest rate that would prevail in an efﬁcient, ﬂexible price, outcome with
x(t) = 0 throughout.
Equation (1a) represents the consumer’s Euler equation. Output growth, equal to
consumption growth, is an increasing function of the real rate of interest, i(t)   p(t). The
natural rate of interest enters this condition because output has been replaced with the
output gap. Equation (1b) is the New-Keynesian, forward-looking Phillips curve. It can
be restated as saying that inﬂation is proportional, with factor k > 0, to the present value





Thus, positive output gaps stimulate inﬂation, while negative output gaps produce deﬂa-
tion. Finally, inequality (1c) is the zero-lower bound on nominal interest rates (hereafter,
ZLB).
As for the constants, r is the discount rate, s 1 is the intertemporal elasticity of substi-
tution and k controls the degree of price stickiness. Lower values of k imply greater price
stickiness. As k ! ¥ we approach the benchmark with perfectly ﬂexible prices, where
high levels of inﬂation or deﬂation are compatible with minuscule output gaps.
A number of caveats are in order. The model I use is the very basic New Keynesian
setting, without any bells and whistles. Basing my analysis on this simple model is con-
venient because it lies at the center of many richer models, so we may learn more general
lessons. It also facilitates the normative analysis, which could quickly become intractable
otherwise. On the other hand, the analysis abstracts from unemployment, and omits dis-
tortionary taxes, ﬁnancial constraints and other frictions which may be relevant in these
situations.











According to this loss function it is desirable to minimize deviations from zero for both
inﬂation and the output gap. The constant l controls the relative weight placed on the
inﬂationary objective. The quadratic nature of the objective is convenient and can be de-
rived as a second order approximation to welfare around zero inﬂation when the ﬂexible
price equilibrium is efﬁcient.3 Such an approximation also suggests that l = ¯ l/k for
3In order to be efﬁcient, the equilibrium requires a constant subsidy to production to undo the monop-
olistic markup. An alternative quadratic objective that does not assume the ﬂexible price equilibrium is
8some constant ¯ l, so that l ! 0 as k ! ¥, as prices become more ﬂexible, price instability
becomes less harmful.
The Natural Rate of Interest. The path for the natural rate fr(t)g plays a crucial role in
the analysis. Indeed, if the natural rate were always positive, so that r(t)  0 for all t  0,
then the ﬂexible price outcome with zero inﬂation and output gap, p(t) = x(t) = 0 for
all t  0, would be feasible and obtained by letting i(t) = r(t) for all t  0. This outcome
is also optimal, since it is ideal according to the loss function (2).
The situation described in the previous paragraph amounts to the case where the ZLB
constraint (1c) is always slack. The focus of this paper is on situations where the ZLB
constraint binds. Thus, I am interested in cases where r(t) < 0 for some range of time.
For a few results it is useful to further assume that the the economy starts in a liquidity
trap that it will eventually and permanently exit at some date T > 0:
r(t) < 0 t < T
r(t)  0 t  T.





r t 2 [0,T)
¯ r t 2 [T,¥)
where ¯ r > 0 > r. I use the step function case in some ﬁgures and simulations, but it is not
required for any of the results in the paper.
Finally, I also make a technical assumption: that r(s) is bounded and that the integral
 t





(x(t)   ¯ x)2 + lp(t)2
dt for ¯ x > 0. Most of the analysis would carry through to this
case.
93 Monetary Policy without Commitment
Before studying optimal policy with commitment, it is useful to consider the situation
without commitment, where the central bank is benevolent but cannot credibly announce
plans for the future. Instead, it acts opportunistically at each point in time, with absolute
discretion. This provides a useful benchmark that illustrates some features commonly as-
sociated with liquidity traps, such as deﬂationary price dynamics and depressed output.
I will also derive some less expected implications on the role of price stickiness. The out-
come without commitment is later contrasted to the optimal solution with commitment.
3.1 Deﬂation and Depression
To isolate the problems created by a complete lack of commitment, I rule out explicit rules
as well as reputational mechanisms that bind or affect the central bank’s actions directly
or indirectly. I construct the unique equilibrium as follows.4 For t  T the natural rate is
positive, r(t) = ¯ r > 0, so that, as mentioned above, the ideal outcome (p(t),x(t)) = (0,0)
is attainable. I assume that the central bank can guarantee this outcome and implements
it so that (p(t),x(t)) = (0,0) for t  T.5 Taking this as given, at all earlier dates t < T the
central bank will ﬁnd it optimal to set the nominal interest rate to zero. The resulting no-
commitment outcome is then uniquely determined by the ODEs (1a)–(1b) with i(t) = 0
for t  T and the boundary condition (p(T),x(T)) = (0,0).6
4In this section, I proceed informally. With continuous time, a formal study of the no-commitment case
requires a dynamic game with commitment over vanishingly small intervals.
5Although this seems like a natural assumption, it presumes that the central bank somehow overcomes
the indeterminacy of equilibria that plagues these models. Usually this can be accomplished, for example,
by adherence to a Taylor rule, with appropriate coefﬁcients. However, following such a rule requires com-
mitment, off the equilibrium path, which is not possible here. However, note that this issue is completely
separate from the zero lower bound on interest rates. Thus, the assumption that (p(t),x(t)) = (0,0) can
be guaranteed for t  T allows us to focus on the interaction between no commitment and a liquidity trap
scenario.
6This outcome coincides with the optimal solution with commitment if one constrains the problem by
imposing (p(T),x(T)) = (0,0). In other words, the ability to commit to outcomes within the interval
t 2 [0,T) is irrelevant; also, the ability to commit once t = T is reached is also irrelevant. What is crucial is




˙ p = 0
˙ x = 0
t = T
Figure 1: The equilibrium without commitment, featuring i(t) = 0 for t  T and reaching
(0,0) at t = T.
ThissituationisdepictedinFigure1whichshowsthedynamicalsystem(1a)–(1b)with
i(t) = 0 and depicts a path leading to (0,0) precisely at t = T. Output and inﬂation are
both negative for t < T as they approach (0,0). Note that the loci on which (p(t),x(t))
must travel towards (0,0) is independent of T, but a larger T requires a starting point
further away from the origin. Thus, initial inﬂation and output are both decreasing in T.
Indeed, as T ! ¥ we have that p(0),x(0) !  ¥.
Proposition 1. Consider a liquidity trap scenario, with r(t) < 0 for t < T and r(t)  0
for t  T. Let pnc(t) and xnc(t) denote the equilibrium outcome without commitment. Then
inﬂation and output are zero after t = T and strictly negative before that:
pnc(t) = xnc(t) = 0 t  T
pnc(t) < 0 xnc(t) < 0 t < T.
11Moreover, p(t) and x(t) are strictly increasing in t for t < T. In the limit as T ! ¥, if the
natural rate satisﬁes
 T
0 r(t;T)ds !  ¥, then
pnc(0,T),xnc(0,T) !  ¥.
Theequilibriumfeaturesdeﬂationanddepression. Theseverityofbothdepend, among
other things, on the duration T of the liquidity trap. Both becomes unbounded as T ! ¥.
In this sense, discretionary policy making may have very adverse welfare implications.
How can the outcome be so dire? The main distortion is that the real interest rate
is set too high during the liquidity trap. This depresses consumption. Importantly, this
effect accumulates over time. Even with zero inﬂation consumption becomes depressed
by s 1  T
t r(t)ds. For example, with log utility s = 1 if the natural rate is -4% and the trap
lasts two years the loss in output is at least 8%. Moreover, matters are just made worse by
deﬂation, which raises the real interest rate even more, further depressing output, leading
to even more deﬂation, in a vicious cycle.
Note that it is the lack of commitment during the liquidity trap t < T to policy ac-
tions and outcomes after the liquidity trap t  T that is problematic. Policy commitment
during the liquidity trap t < T is not useful. Neither is the ability to announce a credible
plan at t = T for the entire future t  T. Indeed, if we add (p(T),x(T)) = (0,0) as a
constraint, then the no commitment outcome is optimal, even when the central bank en-
joys full commitment to any choice over (p(t),x(t),i(t))t6=T satisfying (1a)–(1b) for t < T
and t > T. What is valuable is the ability to commit during the liquidity trap to pol-
icy actions and outcomes after the liquidity trap. In particular, to something other than
(p(T),x(T)) = (0,0).
123.2 Harmful Effects from Price Flexibility
How is this bleak outcome affected by the degree of price stickiness? One might ex-
pect things to improve when prices are more ﬂexible. After all, the main friction in New
Keynesian models is price rigidities, suggesting that outcomes should improve as prices
become more ﬂexible. The next proposition, perhaps counterintuitively, shows that the
reverse is actually the case.
Proposition 2. When prices are more ﬂexible, the outcome without commitment features lower
inﬂation and output. That is, if k < k0 then
pnc(t,k0) < pnc(t,k) < 0 and xnc(t,k0) < xnc(t,k) < 0 for all t < T.
Indeed, for given T > 0 and t < T in the limit as k ! ¥
p(t,k),x(t,k) !  ¥
and L(k) ! ¥.
According to this result, without commitment, price stickiness is beneﬁcial. This
is punctuated by the limit as we approach perfectly ﬂexible prices, which implies un-
bounded levels of deﬂation and depression. This upsets the common perception that
severe consequences from a liquidity trap require signiﬁcant levels of price stickiness.
Quite the contrary, sticky prices hold back deﬂation and mitigate depressions.
To gain intuition for this result, note that the Phillips curve equation (1b) implies that,
for a given negative output gap, a higher k creates more deﬂation. More deﬂation, in turn,
increases the real interest rate i p. By the Euler equation (1a) this requires higher growth
in the output gap ˙ x; since x = 0 at t = T, this translates into a lower level of x for earlier
dates t < T. In words, ﬂexible prices lead to more vigorous deﬂation, raising the real
interest rate and depressing output. Lower output reinforces the deﬂationary pressures,
13creating a vicious cycle. The proof in the appendix echoes this intuition closely.
A similar result is reported in the analysis of ﬁscal multipliers by Christiano et al.
(2011). They compute the equilibrium when monetary policy follows a Taylor rule and
the natural rate of interest is a Poisson process. In this context, they show that output
may be more depressed if prices are more ﬂexible—they do not pursue a limiting result
towards full ﬂexibility.7 My result is somewhat distinct, because it applies to a situation
with optimal discretionary monetary policy, instead of a Taylor rule, and it holds for any
deterministic path for the natural rate. Another difference is that in a Poisson environ-
ment an equilibrium fails to exist, when prices are too ﬂexible. Despite these differences,
the logic for the effect is the same in both cases.8
It is worth remarking that both the zero lower bound and the lack of commitment are
not critical. The same result holds for any path of the natural rate fr(t)g if we assume
the central bank sets the nominal interest rate above the natural rate i(t) = r(t) + D with
D > 0 for some period of time t  T and then switches back to the ﬁrst best outcome
x(t) = p(t) = 0, with i(t) = r(t) for t > T. The zero lower bound and the lack of
commitment just serve to motivate such a scenario, but it could also result from policy
mistakes in interest rate setting.9
The conclusion that price ﬂexibility is always harmful relies on the lack of commit-
ment. Indeed, when the central bank can commit to an optimal policy, price ﬂexibility
may be beneﬁcial. Interestingly, this depends on parameters. Before studying optimal
policy, however, it is useful to consider the effects of commitment to simple non-optimal
policies.
7Basically the same Poisson calculations in Christiano et al. (2011) appear also in Woodford (2011) and
Eggertsson (2011), although the effects of price ﬂexibility are not their focus and so they do not discuss its
effects.
8De Long and Summers (1986) make the point that, for given monetary policy rules, price ﬂexibility may
be destabilizing, even away from a liquidity trap, in the sense of increasing the variance of output.
9Of course a symmetric result holds for D < 0. There is a boom in output alongside inﬂation. The
undesirable boom and inﬂation are ampliﬁed when prices are more ﬂexible, in the sense of a higher k.
143.3 Elbow Room with a Higher Inﬂation Target
We now ask whether there are simple policies the central bank can commit to that avoid
the depression and deﬂation outcomes obtained without commitment. Consider a plan
that keeps inﬂation and output gap constant at
p(t) =  r > 0 x(t) =  
1
k
r > 0 for all t  0.
It follows that i(t) = r(t) + p(t), so that i(t) = 0 for t < T while i(t) = ¯ r + ¯ p > ¯ r > 0 for
t  T.
Although this policy is not optimal, it behaves well in the limit as prices become fully
ﬂexible. Indeed, in this limit as k ! ¥ the output gap converges uniformly to zero while
inﬂation remains constant. Thus, if we adopt the natural case where l = ¯ l/k ! 0,
the loss function converges to its ideal value of zero, L(k) ! 0. Compare this to the
dire outcome without commitment in Proposition 2, where the output gap and losses
converge to  ¥.
Just as in the case without commitment, this simple policy sets the nominal interest
rate to zero during the liquidity trap, for t < T. Note that after the trap, for t > T, the
nominal interest rate is actually set to a higher level than the case without commitment.
Thus, the advantages of this simple policy do not hinge on lower nominal interest rates,
but quite the contrary. Higher inﬂation here coincides with higher nominal interest rates,
due to the Fischer effect. One may still describe the outcome as resulting from looser
monetary policy, but the point is that the kind of monetary easing needed to avoid the
deﬂation and depression does not require lower equilibrium nominal interest rates. As
we shall see in the next section, the optimal policy with commitment does feature lower,
indeed zero, nominal interest rates.
This idea is more general. For any path for the natural interest rate fr(t)g, set a con-
15stant inﬂation rate given by
p(t) = ¯ p =  min
t0
r(t)
and an output gap of x(t) = ¯ x = k ¯ p. This plan is feasible with a non-negative nominal
interest rates i(t)  0. These simple policy capture the main idea behind calls to tol-
erate higher inﬂation targets that leave more “elbow room” for monetary policy during
liquidity traps (e.g. Summers, 1991; Blanchard et al., 2010). However, given the forward
looking nature of inﬂation in this model, what is crucial is the commitment to higher in-
ﬂation after the liquidity trap. This contrasts with the conventional argument, where a
higher inﬂation rate before the trap serves as a precautionary sacriﬁce for future liquidity
traps.
It is perhaps surprising that commitment to a simple policy can avoid deﬂation and
depressed output altogether. Of course, they do so at the expense of inﬂation and over-
stimulated output. If the required inﬂation target ¯ p or output gap ¯ x are large, or if the
duration of the trap T is small, these plans may be quite far from optimal, since they
require a permanent sacriﬁce for the loss function.10 This motivates the study of optimal
monetary policy which I take up next.
4 Optimal Monetary Policy
I now turn to optimal monetary policy with commitment. The central bank’s problem
is to minimize the objective (2) subject to (1a)–(1c) with both initial values of the states,
p(0) and x(0), free. The problem seeks the most preferable outcome, across all those
compatible with an equilibrium. In what follows I focus on characterizing the optimal
10The reason the output gap ¯ x is strictly positive is the New Keynesian model’s non-vertical long-run
Phillips curve. Some papers have explored modiﬁcations of the New Keynesian model that introduce
indexation to past inﬂation. Some forms of full indexation imply that a constant level of inﬂation does not
affect output nor welfare. Thus, with the right form of indexation very simple policies may be optimal or
close to optimal. Of course, this is not the case in the present model without indexation.
16path for inﬂation, output and the nominal interest rate.11
4.1 Optimal Interest Rates, Inﬂation and Output
The problem can be analyzed as an optimal control problem with state (p(t),x(t)) and







lp2 + mxs 1(i   r   p) + mp (rp   kx).
The maximum principle implies that the co-state for x must be non-negative throughout
and zero whenever the nominal interest rate is strictly positive
mx(t)  0, (3a)
i(t)mx(t) = 0. (3b)
The law of motion for the co-states are
˙ mx(t) =  x(t) + kmp(t) + rmx(t), (3c)
˙ mp(t) =  lp(t) + s 1mx(t). (3d)
Finally, because both initial states are free, we have
mx(0) = 0, (3e)
mp(0) = 0. (3f)
11I do not dedicate much discussion to the question of implementation, in terms of a choice of (pos-
sibly time varying) policy functions that would make the optimum a unique equilibrium. It is well
understood that, once the optimum is computed, a time varying interest rate rule of the form i(t) =
i(t) + y(p(t)   p(t)) + y(x(t)   x(t)) ensures that this optimum is the unique local equilibrium. Eg-
gertsson and Woodford (2003) propose a different policy, described in terms of an adjusting target for a
weighted average of output and the price level, that also implements the equilibrium uniquely.
17Taken together, equations (1a)–(1c) and (3a)–(3f) constitute a system for fp(t), x(t), i(t),
mp(t), mx(t)gt2[0,¥). Since the optimization problem is strictly convex, these conditions,
together with appropriate transversality conditions, are both necessary and sufﬁcient for
an optimum. Indeed, the optimum coincides with the unique bounded solution to this
system.
Suppose the zero-bound constraint is not binding over some interval t 2 [t1,t2]. Then
it must be the case that mx(t) = ˙ mx(t) = 0 for t 2 [t1,t2], so that condition (3c) implies
x(t) = kmp(t), while condition (3d) implies ˙ mp(t) =  lp(t). As a result,
˙ x(t) = k ˙ mp(t) =  klp(t) = s 1(i(t)   r(t)   p(t)).
Solving for i(t) gives
i(t) = I(p(t),r(t)),
where
I(p,r)  r(t) + (1  ksl)p,
is a function that gives the optimal nominal rate whenever the zero-bound is not binding.
This is the interest rate condition derived in the traditional analysis that assumes the ZLB
never binds (see e.g. Clarida, Gali and Gertler, 1999, pg. 1683). Note that this rate equals
the natural rate when inﬂation is zero, I(0,r) = r. Thus, it encompasses the well-known
price stability result from basic New-Keynesian models. Away from zero inﬂation, the
interest rate generally departs from the natural rate, unless slk = 1.
Given this result, it follows that I(p(t),r(t))  0 is a necessary condition for the
zero-bound not to bind. The converse, however, is not true.
Proposition 3. Suppose fp(t),x(t),i(t)g is optimal. Then at any point in time t either
i(t) = I(p(t),r(t)) or i(t) = 0. Moreover
I(p(t),r(t)) < 0 for t 2 [t0,t1) =) i(t) = 0 for t 2 [t0,t2]
18with t2 > t1.
According to this result, the nominal interest rate should be held down at zero longer
than what current inﬂation warrants. That is, the optimal path for the nominal interest
rate is not the upper envelope
i(t) 6= maxf0, I(p(t),r(t))g.
Instead, the nominal interest rate should be set below this envelope for some time, at zero.
The notion that committing to future monetary easing is beneﬁcial in a liquidity trap
was ﬁrst put forth by Krugman (1998). His analysis captures the beneﬁts from future
inﬂation only. It is based on a cash-in-advance model where prices cannot adjust within
a period, but are fully ﬂexible between periods. The ﬁrst best is obtained by committing
to money growth and inducing higher future inﬂation. Thus, inﬂation is easily obtained
and costless in the model. Eggertsson and Woodford (2003) work with the same New
Keynesian model as I do here. They report numerical simulations where a prolonged
period of zero interest rates are optimal. My result provides the ﬁrst formal explanation
for these patterns. It also clariﬁes that the relevant comparison for the nominal interest
rate i(t) is the unconstrained optimum I(p(t),r(t)), not the natural rate r(t); the two
are not equivalent, unless ksl = 1. The continuous time framework employed here helps
capture the bang-bang nature of the solution. A discrete-time setting can obscure things
due to time aggregation.
One interesting implication of my result is that the optimal exit strategy features a
discrete jump in the nominal interest rate. Whenever the zero-bound stops binding the
nominal interest must equal I(p(t),r(t)), which given Proposition 3, will generally be
strictly positive. Thus, optimal policy requires a discrete upward jump, from zero, in
the nominal interest rate. Even when economic fundamentals vary smoothly, so that
I(p(t),r(t)) is continuous, the best exit strategy calls for a discontinuous hike in the
19nominal interest rate.
The previous result characterizes nominal interest rates, but what can be said about
the paths for inﬂation and output? This question is important for a number of reasons.
First, output and inﬂation are of direct concern, since they determine welfare. In contrast,
the nominal interest rate is merely an instrument to inﬂuence output and inﬂation. Sec-
ond, as in most monetary models, the equilibrium outcome is not uniquely determined
by the equilibrium path for the nominal interest rate. A central bank wishing to imple-
ment the optimum needs to know more than the path for the nominal interest rate. For
example, the central bank may employ a Taylor rule centered around the target path for
inﬂation i(t) = i(t) + y(p(t)   p(t)) with y > 1. Finally, understanding the outcome
for inﬂation and output sheds light on the kind of policy commitment required.
The next proposition provides results for inﬂation and output. Inﬂation must be pos-
itive at some point in time. Indeed, in some cases, inﬂation is always positive, despite
the liquidity trap. Output, on the other hand, must switch signs. Thus, a future boom in
output is created, but the initial recession is never completely avoided.
Proposition 4. Suppose the ﬁrst-best outcome is not attainable and that fp(t),x(t),i(t)g
is optimal. Then inﬂation must be strictly positive at some point in time. Output is initially
negative, but becomes strictly positive at some point. If ksl = 1 then inﬂation is initially zero
and is nonnegative throughout, p(0) = 0 and p(t)  0 for all t  0.
There are two things optimal monetary policy accomplishes. First and most obvious,
it promotes inﬂation. This helps mitigate the deﬂationary spiral during the liquidity trap.
Lower deﬂation, or even inﬂation, lowers the real rate of interest, which is the true root of
the problem in a liquidity trap. Second, due to the non-neutrality of money, it stimulates
future output, after the trap. This percolates back in time, increasing output during the
trap. Anticipating a boom, consumers lower their saving and increase current consump-
tion, mitigating the negative output gap.
Inthismodelthetwogoalsarerelated, sinceinﬂationrequiresaboominoutput. Thus,
20pursuing the ﬁrst goal already leads, incidentally, to the second, and vice versa. Impor-
tantly, the nominal interest rate path implied by Proposition 3 stimulates a larger boom
than that required by the inﬂation promise. To see this, suppose that along the optimal
plan I(p(t),r(t))  0 for t  t1, and I(p(t),r(t)) < 0 otherwise. The optimal plan then
calls for i(t) = 0 over some interval t 2 [t1,t2]. However, consider an alternative plan
that has the same inﬂation at t1, so that p(t1) = p(t1), but, in contradiction with Propo-
sition 3, features i(t) = I(p(t),r(t)) for all t  t1.12 Suppose also that, for both plans,
the long-run output gap is zero: limt!¥ x(t) = limt!¥ x(t) = 0. It then follows that
x(t1) < x(t1). In this sense, holding down the interest rate to zero stimulates a boom
that is greater than the one implied by the inﬂation promise.
Figure 2 plots the equilibrium paths for a numerical example. The parameters are set
to T = 2, s = 1, k = .5 and l = 1/k. These choices are made for illustrative purposes
and to ensure that ksl = 1. They do not represent a calibration. The choices are tilted
towards a ﬂexible price situation. Relative to the New Keynesian literature, the degree of
price stickiness is low (high k) and the planner is quite tolerant of inﬂation (low l). It is
also common to set a lower value for s, on the grounds that investment, which may be
quite sensitive to the interest rate, has been omitted from the analysis.
The black line represents the equilibrium with discretion; the blue line, the optimum
with commitment. With discretion output is initial depressed by about 11%, at the op-
timum this is reduced to just under 4%. The optimum features a boom which peaks at
about 3% at t = T. The discretionary case features signiﬁcant deﬂation. In contrast, be-
cause ksl = 1 optimal inﬂation starts at zero and is always positive. Both paths end at
origin, which represents the ideal ﬁrst-best outcome. However, although the optimum
reaches it later at ˆ T = 2.7, it circles around it, managing to stay closer to it on average.
This improves welfare.
12Note that, depending on the value of ksl, the interest rate may even be greater than the natural rate
r(t). The fact that this policy is consistent with positive inﬂation and output after the trap even though
it may have higher interest rates than the discretionary solution underscores, once again, that monetary
easing does not necessarily manifest itself in lower equilibrium interest rates.






Figure 2: A numerical example showing the full discretion case (black) and optimal com-
mitment case (blue).
One implication of Proposition 4 is that, whenever the ﬁrst best is unattainable, op-
timal monetary policy requires commitment. Output is initially negative x(0)  0, but
must turn strictly positive x(t0) > 0 at some future date for t0 > 0. This implies that, if
the planner can reoptimize and make a new credible plan at time t0, then this new plan
would involve initially negative output x(t0)  0. Hence, it cannot coincide with the
original plan which called for positive output.
Note that the kind of commitment needed in this model involves more than a promise
for future inﬂation, at time T, as in Krugman (1998). Indeed, my discussion here em-
phasizes commitment to an output boom. More generally, the planning problem features
both p and x as state variables, so commitment to deliver promises for both inﬂation and
output are generally required.
Proposition 4 highlights the case with ksl = 1, where inﬂation starts and ends at zero
and is positive throughout. This case occurs when the costate mp(t) on the Phillips curve
is zero for all t  0. This case turns out to be an interesting benchmark. Numerical results
22show the following pattern, which I state as a conjecture.13
Conjecture. Suppose fp(t),x(t),i(t)g is optimal and not equal to the ﬁrst best. If ksl < 1
then p(t) > 0 for all t. If ksl > 1 then p(0) < 0.
Liquidity traps are commonly associated with deﬂation, but these results suggest that
the optimum completely avoids deﬂation in some cases. This is more likely to be the case
if prices are less ﬂexible (low k), if the intertemporal elasticity of substitution is high (low
s), or if the central bank is not too concerned about inﬂation (low l). Note that if we set
l = ¯ l/k, then ksl = ls, so the degree of price ﬂexibility k drops out of the condition
determining the sign of initial inﬂation. In the other case, when ksl < 1, the optimum
does feature deﬂation initially, but transitions through a period of positive inﬂation as
shown by Proposition 4. Numerical simulations return to deﬂation and a negative output
gap.
It is worth noting that prolonged zero nominal interest rates are not needed to pro-
mote positive inﬂation and stimulate output after the trap. Indeed, there are equilibria
with both features and a nominal interest rate path given by i(t) = maxf0, I(p(t),r(t))g.
In the liquidity trap scenario, the same is true for the interest rate path considered under
pure discretion, i(t) = 0 for t < T and i(t) = r(t) for t  T. Without commitment,
a unique equilibrium was obtained by adding the condition that the ﬁrst best outcome
p(t) = x(t) = 0 was implemented for t  T. However, positive inﬂation and output,
p(T),x(T)  0 are also compatible with this very same interest rate path. This is possi-
ble because equilibrium outcomes are not uniquely determined by equilibrium nominal
interest rates. Policy may still be described as one of monetary easing, even if this is not
necessarily reﬂected in equilibrium nominal interest rates.14
13I veriﬁed this conjecture numerically for a very wide set of the parameter values in the step-wise liq-
uidity trap scenario. My procedure solves the optimum in near closed form as a solution to an ODE with
boundary conditions. Thus, it is very fast, essentially instantaneous for a single parametrization. This
makes checking the conjecture automatically over a large set of parameters feasible. To do so, for each pa-
rameter I set up a dense and wide grid of values. Using loops, I then had the conjecture checked over the
Cartesian product of these grids.
14To be speciﬁc, suppose policy is determined endogenously according to a simple Taylor rule, with a
234.2 A Simple Case: Fully Rigid Prices
To gain intuition it helps to consider the extreme case with fully rigid prices, where k = 0
and p(t) = 0 for all t  0.15 Consider the liquidity trap scenario, where r(t) < 0 for t < T
and r(t) > 0 for t > T, and suppose we keep the nominal interest rate at zero until some
time ˆ T  T, and implement x(t) = p(t) = 0 after ˆ T. Output is then




Note that if ˆ T = T then x(t,T) < 0 for t < T, a special case of Proposition 1. More
generally, output rises up to time T, and then falls and reaches zero at time ˆ T. Higher ˆ T
increases the path for output x(, ˆ T) in a parallel fashion, so that, as long as ˆ T is greater
than T, but not too large, output starts out strictly negative and then turns strictly positive
for a while. Larger values of ˆ T shrink the initially negative output gaps, but lead to larger
positive gaps later.
It follows that, starting from ˆ T = T an increase in ˆ T improves welfare, since the loses
from creating positive output gaps are second order, while the gains from reducing the
pre-existing negative output gaps are ﬁrst order. More formally, the optimum minimizes
the objective V( ˆ T)  1
2
 ¥
0 e rtx(t; ˆ T)2dt, implying
V0( ˆ T) = r( ˆ T)s 1
 ˆ T
0
e rtx(t; ˆ T)dt = 0.
It follows that T < ˆ T < ¯ T where x(0, ¯ T) = 0. Monetary easing goes beyond the liquidity
trap, but stops short of preventing a recession. Indeed, the optimality condition implies
time varying intercept, i(t) = ¯ i(t)+fpp(t) with fp > 1. In the unique bounded equilibrium, a temporarily
low value for ¯ i(t) typically leads to higher inﬂation p(t), but not necessarily a lower equilibrium interest
rate i(t). The outcome for the nominal interest rate i(t) depends on various parameters. Either way, the
situation with temporarily low ¯ i(t) may be described as one of “monetary easing”.
15The same conditions we will obtain for k = 0 here can be obtained if we consider the limit of the general
optimality conditions derived above as k ! 0. However, it is more revealing to derive the optimality
condition from a separate perturbation argument.
24that the present value of output is zero

e rtx(t)dt = 0, so that the recession and the
subsequent boom average out.
Thus, with fully rigid prices the promise to hold nominal interest rates at zero longer
is optimal because it creates an output boom that peaks at time T and helps mitigate the
earlier recession. Inﬂation is zero regardless of monetary policy in this extreme case, so
it isolates only one of the two motives for monetary easing discussed in the previous
subsection. In this sense, it is the polar opposite of Krugman’s example, which isolated
the inﬂationary motive only. Next I turn to a graphical analysis of intermediate cases,
where both motives are present.
4.3 Stitching a Solution Together: A Graphical Representation
To see the solution graphically, consider the particular liquidity trap scenario with the
step function path for the natural rate of interest: r(t) = r < 0 for t < T but r(t) = ¯ r  0
for t  T. It is useful to break up the solution into three separate phases, from back to
front. I ﬁrst consider the solution after some time ˆ T > T when the ZLB constraint is no
longer binding (Phase III). I then consider the solution between time T and ˆ T with the
ZLB constraint (Phase II). Finally, I consider the solution during the trap t 2 [0,T] (Phase
I).
After the Storm: Slack ZLB Constraint (Phase III). Consider the problem where the
ZLB constraint is ignored, or no longer binding. If this were true for all time t  0 then
the solution would be the ﬁrst best p(t) = x(t) = 0. However, here I am concerned with
a situation where the ZLB constraint is slack only after some date ˆ T > T > 0, at which
point the state (p( ˆ T),x( ˆ T)) is given and no longer free, so the ﬁrst best is generally not
feasible.
TheplanningproblemnowignorestheZLBconstraintbuttakestheinitialstate(p0,x0)
as given. Because the ZLB constraint is absent, the constraint representing the Euler equa-
25tion is not binding. Thus, it is appropriate to ignore this constraint and drop the output
gap x(t) as a state variable, treating it as a control variable instead. The only remain-
ing state is inﬂation p(t).16 Also note that the path of the natural interest rate fr(t)g is
irrelevant when the ZLB constraint is ignored.
I seek a solution for output x as a function of inﬂation p. Using the optimality con-
ditions with mx(t) = 0 one can show that i(t) = I(p(t),r(t)) as discussed earlier, with
output satisfying
x(t) = fp(t)
and costate mp(t) =
f




2k so that f > r/k. The last inequality
implies that the ray x = fp is steeper than that for ˙ p = 0. Thus, starting with any
initial value of p the solution converges over time along the loci x = fp to the origin
(p(t),x(t)) ! (0,0). These dynamics are illustrated in Figure 3.
Just out of the Trap (Phase II). Consider next the problem for t  T incorporating the
ZLB constraint for any arbitrary starting point (p(T),x(T)). The problem is stationary
since r(t) = ¯ r > 0 for t  T.
If the initial state lies on the loci x = fp, then the solution coincides with the one
above. This is essentially also the case when the initial state satisﬁes x < fp, since one can
engineer an upward jump in x to reach the loci x = fp.17 After this jump, one proceeds
with the solution that ignores the ZLB constraint. In contrast, the optimum features an
initial state that satisﬁes x > fp. Intuitively, the optimum attempts to reach the red line
as quickly as possible, by setting the nominal interest rate to zero until x = fp.
16One can pick any absolutely continuous path for x(t) and solve for the required nominal interest rate
as a residual: i(t) = s ˙ x(t) + p(t) + r(t). Discontinuous paths for x(t) can be approximated arbitrarily
well by continuous ones. Intuitively, it is as if discontinuous paths for fx(t)g are possible, since upward
or downward jumps in x(t) can be engineered by setting the interest rate to ¥ or  ¥ for an inﬁnitesimal
moment in time. Formally, the supremum for the problem that ignores the ZLB constraint, but carries both
p(t) and x(t) as states, is independent of the current value of x(t). Since the current value of x(t) does not
meaningfully constrain the planning problem, it can be ignored as a state variable.
17For example, set i(t) = D/# > 0 for a short period of time [0,#) and choose D so that x(#) = fp(#). As
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Figure 5: The solution for t  T and r(t) =  ¯ r < 0 with the ZLB constraint binding.
These dynamics are illustrated in Figure 3 using the phase diagram implied by the
system (1a)–(1b) with i(t) = 0. The steady state with ˙ x = ˙ p = 0 involves deﬂation and a
negative output gap: p =  ¯ r < 0 and x =  
r
k¯ r < 0. As a result, for inﬂation rates near
zero the output gap falls over time. As before, the red line denotes the loci x = fp, for
the solution to the problem ignoring the ZLB constraint. For two initial values satisfying
x > fp, the ﬁgure shows the trajectories in green implied by the system (1a)–(1b) with
i(t) = 0. Along these paths x(t) and p(t) fall over time, eventually reaching the loci
x = fp. After this point, the state follows the solution ignoring the ZLB constraint,
staying on the x = fp line and converges towards the origin.
During the Liquidity Trap (Phase I) During the liquidity trap t  T the ZLB constraint
binds and i(t) = 0. The dynamics are illustrated in Figure 5 using the phase diagram
implied by equations (1a) and (1b) setting i(t) = 0. For reference, the red line denoting
the optimum ignoring the ZLB constraint is also show.
28Unlike the previous case, the steady state ˙ x = ˙ p = 0 for this system now has positive
inﬂation and a positive output gap: p =  r > 0 and x =  
r
kr > 0. In contrast to the
previous phase diagram, also featuring i(t) = 0, for inﬂation rates near zero the output
gap rises over time. Two trajectories are shown in green. Both trajectories start at t = 0
below the red line are above it at t = T. In one case the inﬂation rate is initially negative,
while in the other it is positive. In both cases the output gap is initially negative and
becomes positive some time before t = T.
Figure 6 puts the three phases together to display two possible optimal paths for all
t  0. The two trajectories illustrated in the ﬁgure are quite representative and illustrate
the possibilities described in Proposition 4.
As these ﬁgures suggest one can prove that the nominal interest rate should be kept
at zero past T. The following proposition follows from Proposition 3 and elements of the
dynamics captured by the phase diagrams.
Proposition 5. Consider the liquidity trap scenario with r(t) = r < 0 for t < T and r(t) = ¯ r >
0 for t  T. Suppose the path fp(t),x(t),i(t)g is optimal. Then there exists a ˆ T > T such
that
i(t) = 0 8t 2 [0, ˆ T].
There are two ways of summarizing the optimal plan. In the ﬁrst, the central bank
commits to a zero nominal interest rate during the liquidity trap, for t 2 [0,T]. It also
makes a commitment to an inﬂation rate and output gap target (p(T),x(T)) after the
trap. However, note that here
x(T) > fp(T)
so that the promised boom in output is higher than that implied by the inﬂation promise.
Commitment to a target at time T is needed not just in terms of inﬂation, but also in terms
of the output gap.




˙ p = 0
x = fp
Figure 6: Two possible paths of the solution for t  0.
ting a zero interest rate at zero for longer than the liquidity trap, so that i(t) = 0 for
t 2 [0, ˆ T] with ˆ T > T. It also commits to implementing an inﬂation rate p( ˆ T) upon exit of
the ZLB, at time ˆ T. In this case, no further commitment regarding x( ˆ T) is required, since
x( ˆ T) = fp( ˆ T) is ex-post optimal given the promised p( ˆ T). Note that the level of inﬂation
promised in this case may be positive or negative, depending on the sign of 1   ksl. A
commitment to positive inﬂation once interest rates become positive is not necessarily a
feature of all optimum.
5 Government Spending: Opportunistic and Stimulus
I now introduce government spending as an additional instrument. I ﬁrst consider the
full optimum over both ﬁscal and monetary policy. I then turn to a more restricted case,
where monetary policy is conducted with complete discretion and is, thus, suboptimal.
Fiscalpolicy, ontheotherhand, ischosenwithcommitment. Thiscapturesthenotionthat,
30for both technical and political reasons, announcements of future government spending
may be more credible than those for monetary policy. Finally, I brieﬂy discuss the case
where both ﬁscal and monetary policy are conducted with full discretion.









(c(t) + (1  G)g(t))




˙ c(t) = s 1(i(t)   r(t)   p(t))
˙ p(t) = rp(t)   k (c(t) + (1  G)g(t))
i(t)  0
x(0),p(0) free.
Heretheconstantssatisfy h > 0and G 2 (0,1); thevariable c(t) = (C(t) C(t))/C(t) 
log(C(t))   log(C(t)) represents the private consumption gap, while g(t) = (G(t)  
G(t))/C(t) represents the government consumption gap, normalized by private con-
sumption.
The coefﬁcient G 2 (0,1) represents the ﬁrst best, or ﬂexible-price equilibrium, gov-
ernment spending multiplier, i.e. for each unit increase in spending, output increases
by G units, consumption is reduced by 1   G units. The loss function captures this, be-
cause given spending g, the ideal consumption level is c =  (1  G)g. The Phillips curve
shows that c =  (1   G)g also corresponds to a situation with zero inﬂation, replicating
the ﬂexible-price equilibrium.
The potential usefulness of the additional spending instrument g can be easily seen
noting that spending can zero out the ﬁrst two quadratic terms in the loss function, en-






For simplicity, suppose we set i(t) = 0 for t < T and i(t) = r(t) for t  T. Then spending







After this, spending is ﬂat g(t) = g(T) for t  T. To minimize the quadratic loss from
spending, the optimal initial value g(0) is set to ensures that g(t) takes on both signs:
g(0) is positive and g(T) is negative. The same is true for consumption, since c(t) =
 (1  G)g(t).
Although this plan is not optimal, it is suggestive that optimal spending may take on
both positive and negative values during a liquidity trap. We prove this result in the next
subsection.
5.1 The Optimal Pattern for Spending
It will be useful to transform the planning problem by a change variables. In fact, I will
use two transformations. Each has its own advantages.














˙ x(t) = (1  G) ˙ g(t) + s 1(i(t)   r(t)   p(t))
˙ p(t) = rp(t)   kx(t)
i(t)  0
x(0),p(0) free.
This is an optimal control problem with i(t) and g(t) as controls and x and p as states.
According to the objective, the ideal level of government spending, given the state vari-
ables x(t) and p(t), is always zero, g(t). However, because spending also appears in the
constraints, it may help relax them. In particular, spending enters the constraint associ-
ated with the consumer’s Euler equation. Indeed, the change in spending ˙ g(t) plays a
role that is analogous to the nominal interest rate i(t). Unlike the latter, the former is not
restricted to being nonnegative.
Since government spending relaxes the Euler equation, it should be zero whenever the
zero-bound constraint is not binding, which is the case whenever i(t) > 0. Conversely, if
the zero-bound constraint binds and i(t) = 0 then government spending is not generally
zero. Asthenextpropositionshows, spendingisinitiallypositive, thenbecomesnegative,
and ﬁnally returns to zero.
Proposition 6. Suppose the zero lower bound binds over the interval (t0,t1) and is slack in a
neighborhood outside it. Then g(t0) > 0, g(t1) = 0 with g(t) < 0 for t < t1 in a neighborhood
of t1.
This result conﬁrms the notion that government spending should be front loaded. It
mayseemsurprising, however, thatoptimalspendingtakesonbothpositiveandnegative
values. The intuition is as follows. Initially, higher spending helps compensate for the
negative consumption gap at the start of a liquidity trap. However, recall that optimal









Figure 7: A numerical example. The optimum without spending (blue) vs. the optimum
with spending for output (red) and consumption (orange).
monetary policy eventually engineers a consumption boom. If government spending
leans against the wind, we should expect lower spending. The next subsection reﬁnes
this intuition by decomposing spending into an opportunistic and a stimulus component.
Figure 7 provides a numerical example, following the same parametrization used for
the example in Section 4, with the additional parameters G = 0.5 and h = .5. The ﬁgure
shows both consumption and output. As we see from the ﬁgure consumption is not as
affected as output is in this case.
5.2 Opportunistic vs. Stimulus Spending
Even a shortsighted government that ignores dynamic general equilibrium effects on the
private sector, ﬁnds reasons to increase government spending during a slump. When the
economy is depressed, the wage, or shadow wage, is lowered. This provides a cheap
opportunity for government consumption.
Based on this notion, I deﬁne an opportunistic component of spending, the level that
34is optimal from a simple static, cost-beneﬁt calculation. I then deﬁne the stimulus compo-
nent of spending as the difference between actual spending and the opportunistic com-
ponent. More precisely, given private consumption c, deﬁne opportunistic spending by




(c + (1  G)g)2 + hg2
o
,
Deﬁne stimulus spending as the difference between actual and opportunistic spending,






c + (1  G)g(c) = yc,
with the constant y  h/
 
h + (1  G)2
2 (0,1). Thus, opportunistic spending leans
against the wind, y < 1, but does not close the gap, y > 0.













˙ c(t) = s 1(i(t)   r(t)   p(t))
˙ p(t) = rp(t)   k (yc(t) + (1  G)ˆ g(t))
i(t)  0,
c(0),p(0) free.
35where ˆ l = l/y and ˆ h = h/y2. According to the loss function, the ideal level of stimulus
spending is zero. However, stimulus may help relax the Phillips curve constraint.






This gives a ﬁrst result. Unlike total spending, stimulus spending is initially zero.
Proposition 7. Stimulus spending is always initially zero ˆ g(0) = 0.
Thus, total spending at the start of a liquidity trap is entirely opportunistic.18
To say more, note that the costate for the Phillips curve, unlike the costate for the Euler
equation, is not restricted to being nonnegative and the path it takes actually depends on
parameters. Indeed, my main result for stimulus spending exploits this fact, providing a
benchmark where stimulus spending is always zero.
Proposition 8. Suppose ksl = 1. Then at an optimum ˆ g(t) = 0 for all t  0.
Thus, under the conditions of the proposition, spending is entirely determined by its
opportunistic considerations. It is as if spending were chosen by a purely static cost-
beneﬁt calculation, with no regards for its dynamic general equilibrium impact on the
economy. By implication, in this case government spending could be determined by a
naive agency, lacking commitment, that performs a static cost-beneﬁt calculation, ignor-
ing the dynamic effects this has on the private sector.
Figure 8 displays the optimal paths for total, opportunistic and stimulus spending for
our numerical example (with the same parameters as those behind Figure 7). Spending
starts at 2% of output above it’s efﬁcient level. It then falls at a steady state reaching
18Another implication of equation (4) is that stimulus spending, unlike total spending, may be nonzero
even when the zero lower bound constraint is not currently binding and will never bind in the future. This
occurs whenever inﬂation is nonzero. Indeed, since total spending must be zero, stimulus spending must
be canceling out opportunistic spending. This makes sense. If we have promised positive inﬂation, for
example, then we require a positive gap. Opportunistic spending would call for lower spending, but doing
so would frustrate stimulating the promised inﬂation.







Figure 8: Total spending (blue), opportunistic spending (green) and stimulus spending
(red) for a numerical example. Both the case with monetary commitment (circles) and
discretion (triangles) are shown.
almost 2% below its efﬁcient level of output. In this example, spending is virtually all
opportunistic. Stimulus spending is virtually zero.
Away from this benchmark, numerical simulations show that stimulus starts at zero, it
hasasinusoidalshape, switchingsignsonce. Whenksl > 1itﬁrstbecomespositive, then
turns negative, eventually asymptoting to zero from below; when ksl < 1 the reverse
pattern obtains: ﬁrst negative, then turns positive, eventually asymptoting to zero from
above. In most cases, stimulus spending is a small component of total spending.
The results highlight that positive stimulus spending is just not a robust feature of
the optimum for this model. Opportunistic spending does affect private consumption,
by affecting the path for inﬂation. In particular, by leaning against the wind, it promotes
price stability, mitigates both deﬂations and inﬂations. However, the effects are inciden-
tal, in that they would be obtained by a policy maker choosing spending that ignores
these effects.
376 Spending with Discretionary Monetary Policy
I now relax the assumption of full commitment and consider a mixed case, where mon-
etary policy is discretionary, as in Section 3, while government spending is carried out
with commitment during the trap.
More speciﬁcally, consider the liquidity trap scenario, where r(t) < 0 for t < T and
r(t)  0 for t  T. Once the liquidity trap is over, monetary policy will implement the
ﬂexible-price equilibrium, so that c(t) + (1   G)g(t) = 0 and p(t) = 0 for all t  T.
During the trap, the nominal interest rate is set to zero, i(t) = 0 for t < T. In contrast,
the government spending can be credibly announced, at least for some time. I initially
assume that spending after T is chosen with discretion, implying that g(t) = 0 for t  T.
I then consider the case with commitment on the entire path for government spending,
for all t 2 [0,¥).
Government spending may be a powerful tool in this scenario. Absent spending, de-
ﬂationanddepressionprevail. But, asIarguedabove, spendingcanavoidboth, achieving
a zero output gap and inﬂation rate, c(t) + (1  G)g(t) = p(t) = 0 for all t  0. It does so
by ﬁlling in the gap left by consumption. Of course, this simple plan is suboptimal. Next,
I study optimal spending commitments.
6.1 Commitment to spending during the liquidity trap
The planning problem is essentially the same as before19 with the additional constraint
that
p(T) = c(T) = 0.
19Except that we may impose i(t) = 0 for t < T since this is chosen by the monetary authority. However,
the optimum will also feature this interest rate path.





with the law of motion for the co-states as before. Thus, just as before, stimulus spending
is initially zero.
It is difﬁcult to formally characterize the rest of the solution. I make progress by con-
sidering small stimulus spending interventions, starting from spending. Speciﬁcally, con-




to the planning problem. Here G is a parameter. Setting G = 0 implies the no commit-
ment outcome, without spending or stimulus, which involves deﬂation and depression.
For G > 0 large enough the constraint no longer binds. The idea is to characterize the
optimum for small enough G > 0. This allows us to use the above formula for spending,
with the costates evaluated at the original no spending and no discretion equilibrium.
Proposition 9. ˆ g(0) = 0. For small enough G > 0, ˆ g(t)  0 and is strictly increasing in t.
Moreover, total spending is positive g(t) > 0 for all t 2 [0,T).
Simulations support that this pattern generally carries over for the case where G is
chosen freely. Figure 8 conﬁrms this for the numerical example from the previous sec-
tions. In this example, total spending is quite large and relatively ﬂat. As opportunistic
spending falls, stimulus spending rises and compensates.
6.2 Commitment to spending after the liquidity trap
I now relax the assumption that ﬁscal policy cannot commit past T. Thus, I now consider
a situation where spending is chosen for the entire future fg(t)g¥
t=0, allowing for g(t) 6= 0
39for t  T.
This problem can be simpliﬁed by looking at the subproblem from t  T. Clearly for
any positive consumption c(T) > 0 the optimum calls for i(t) = 0 and g(t) = ˜ g(t) for
t 2 [T,T + D] and g(t) for t > T + D, where










e rsh ˜ g(T + s)2ds.













˙ c(t) = s 1(i(t)   r(t)   p(t))
˙ p(t) = rp(t)   k (yc(t) + (1  G)ˆ g(t))
i(t)  0,
p(T) = 0.
Under this formulation c(T) is a free variable, but the planner incurs a cost Y(c(T)). The
new optimality condition (replacing c(T) = 0) is the transversality condition
mc(T) = Y0(c(T)).
A similar result applies in this case. For a small intervention, stimulus spending is pos-
40itive and increasing. Now, however, spending after the trap is negative, to promote a
boom in consumption c(T), which helps raise the level of consumption at earlier dates,
during the trap.
7 Conclusion
This paper has revisited monetary policy during a liquidity trap. The continuous time
setup up offers some distinct advantages in terms of the analysis and results that are
obtained. Some of my results support the ﬁndings from prior work based on simulations.
Pptimal monetary policy in the model is engineered to promote inﬂation and an output
boom. It does so, in part, by commiting to holding the nominal interest rate at zero for an
extended period of time.
To the best of my knowledge, my results on government spending have no clear paral-
lel in the literature. In particular, the decomposition between opportunistic and stimulus
spending is novel and leads to unexpected results.
When both ﬁscal and monetary policy are coordinated, I ﬁnd that optimal govern-
ment spending starts at a positive level, but declines and become negative. However, I
show that most of these dynamics are explained by a cost-beneﬁt motive for spending,
which, by deﬁnition, ignores the effects this spending has on private consumption and
inﬂation. At the model’s optimum, stimulus spending is always initially zero. Moreover,
depending on parameters. stimulus may be identically zero throughout or deviate from
zero changing signs. However, simulations show stimulus spending playing a modest
role.
This situation can be very different when monetary policy is suboptimal due to the
lack of commitment. In this case, the model’s optimal policy calls for positive and in-
creasing stimulus spending during the trap and lower spending after the trap.
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A Proof of Proposition 1
Recall that p(t) = x(t) = 0 for t  T. In integral form the equilibrium conditions for



































43with a(t)  s 1  T
t r(z)dz and m(s)  (sr) 1(1   e rs), note that m is nonnegative,
strictly increasing, with m(0) = 0 and lims!¥ m(s) = M  (sr) 1 > 0.
The operator T maps the space of continuous functions on ( ¥,T] onto itself. An
equilibrium x is a ﬁxed point T[x] = x. Since an equilibrium represents a solution to
an initial value problem for a linear ordinary differential equation, there is a unique ﬁxed
point x. The T operator is linear and monotone (since m  0), so that if xa  xb then
T[xa]  T[xb].
Fix an interval [ˆ t,T]. Although T is not a contraction, starting from any continuous
function x0 that is bounded on [ˆ t,T] and deﬁning xn  Tn[x0] we obtain a sequence that
converges uniformly on [ˆ t,T] to the unique ﬁxed point xn ! x. To prove this claim, note
that since jx0(t)j  B and jr(t)j  R then
jx1(t)   x0(t)j  ja(t)j + k
 T
t








jx2(t)   x1(t)j = jT[x1](t)   T[x0](t)j  k
 T
t











2 jT   tj2
2
.
By induction it follows that






















44As a consequence for any m  n









Since the right hand converges to zero as n ! ¥, for any # > 0 and t0 < T there exists an
N such that for all n,m  N we have
jxn(t)   xm(t)j  #
for all t  t0. Thus, fxng is a Cauchy sequence on a complete metric space, implying that
xn ! x where x is a bounded function. Since the operator T is continuous it follows
that x is a ﬁxed point x = T[x].
Note that starting from the zero function x0(t) = 0 for all t we obtain x1(t) = a(t) < 0
for t < T. Since the operator T is monotone, the sequence fxng is decreasing x0  x1 
  xn   Thus, x(t) < x1(t) < 0 for all t < T. This implies p(t) < 0 for t < T.
Next I establish that both inﬂation and output x(t) and p(t) are monotone. Note
that ¶
¶tT[x](t) = a0(t)  
 T
t m0(z   t)x(z)dz. Since a0(t) =  s 1r(t) > 0 and x(t) < 0
for t < T we have that T[x](t) = x(t) is strictly increasing in t for t < T. Likewise,
differentiating we ﬁnd ˙ p(t) = rk
 ¥
0 e rz(x(t + s)   x(t))ds, which implies ˙ p(t) > 0 for











0 r(s;T)ds !  ¥ as T ! ¥ it follows that
 T
t r(s;T)ds !  ¥, implying












As T ! ¥ we have that x(t + 1;T) !  ¥, so it follows that p(t;T) !  ¥ for any t.
B Proof of Proposition 2
Consider two values k0 < k1 with associated equilibria x
0 and x
1. Let T[;k] be the op-
erator deﬁned in the proof of Proposition 1 associated with k. Deﬁne the sequence xn =
Tn[x
0;k1]. Since x
0(t) < 0 for t < T, it follows that x1(t) = T[x
0;k1] < T[x
0;k0] = x0(t)
for t < T. Since the operator T[;k0] is monotone, this implies that fxng is a declining
sequence. Since the sequence converges to x
1. This proves that x
0(t) > x1(t) >  >
xn(t) >  > x
1(t) for t < T. This implies that p
1(t) < p
0(t) for t < T.
To prove the limit result as k1 ! ¥ it sufﬁces to show that T[x
0;k1](t) !  ¥ for all
t < T. This follows from
T[x








and the result follows from the fact that
 T
t m(z   t)a(z)dz < 0 for all t < T. The same
implication for p(t;k) then follows.











where I have used that x is nonpositive and increasing. The result then follows since
x(T/2;k) !  ¥.
46C Proof of Proposition 3
Suppose i(t) > 0 for t 2 (t0,t0 + #) with # > 0. Then it must be that m(t) = ˙ m(t) = 0 for
t 2 [t0,t0 + #). However, whenever ˙ mx(t)  0 we have
˙ ˙ mx(t) =   ˙ x(t) + k ˙ mp(t) + r ˙ mx(t)
  s 1(i(t)   r(t)   p(t))   klp(t)
= s 1 (I(p(t),t)   i(t))
where I have used that mx(t)  0.
It follows that if I(p(t),t) < 0 for t 2 (t0   #,t0) then ˙ ˙ mx(t) < 0. Since ˙ mx(t0) = 0 this
implies ˙ mx(t) > 0 for t 2 (t0   #,t0). Given that mx(t0) = 0 this then implies that mx(t) < 0
for t 2 (t0   #,t0), a contradiction with the optimality conditions.
D Proof of Proposition 4
The initial conditions require mx(0) = mp(0) = 0. The non-negativity requirement for mx
then requires ˙ mx(0) =  x(0)  0, implying x(0)  0.
To establish that inﬂation must be positive at some point, consider the perturbation




e rsx(t + s,#)ds = k
 ¥
0
e rsx(t + s)ds + k
 ¥
0




Note that the perturbation is feasible for all # > 0 since higher inﬂation relaxes the ZLB































Hence, negative inﬂation p(t)  0 for all t  0 with strict inequality over some range,
implies L0(0) < 0, a contradiction with optimality.
Now suppose ksl = 1. Suppose (p(t),x(t)) satisfy the ODE system (1a)–(1b) with
i(t) = 0 for t 2 [0, ˆ T] with ˆ T > T. Now set mp(t) = 0 and deﬁne mx(t) = slp(t) so that
˙ mp = 0 =  lp + s 1mx
˙ mx(t) = sl(rp(t)   kx(t)) =  x(t) + rslp(t)
are both satisﬁed. It follows that (p(t),x(t))t2[0, ˆ T] together with p(t) = x(t) = 0 for t > ˆ T
is optimal if and only if p(t)  0 and p(0) = p( ˆ T) = 0 and x( ˆ T) = 0.
To establish that x(t) must be positive for some t  0, proceed by contradiction. Sup-
pose x(t)  0 for all t  0. This implies that p(t)  0 for all t  0, a contradiction.
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